2016 — приз лучшему выпускнику от Гарвардского студенческого совета.
Библиография
Дрю Фуденберг опубликовал ряд книг и статей
:
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (with J. Tirole), Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986, 83 pp.
Game Theory (with J. Tirole), MIT Press, 1991, 579 p.
The Theory of Learning in Games (with D.K. Levine), MIT Press, 1998, 276 pp, translated into Chinese by Renmin University Press, Beijing.
A Long Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games (with D.K. Levine) World Scientific Press, 2009, 391 pages.
Negotiations, Strikes, and Wage Settlements, (with D.K. Levine and P. Ruud), paper presented at NBER Conference on Trade Unions, May 1983.
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms for Adverse Selection Problems, (with D.K. Levine and E. Maskin), 1991.
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets, (with D.K. Levine), 1994.
Evolution and Noisy Repeated Games, (with E. Maskin), 1994.
Learning in Extensive Form Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium, (with D. Kreps), 1996.
Stochastic Stability in Birth-Death Processes on Large Populations, (with D. Hojman), 2008.
Whither Game Theory?», (with D.K. Levine), 2016.
Self-Control, Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments, (with A. Dreber, D.K. Levine, and D.G. Rand), 2016.
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons, (with J. Block and D.K. Levine), 2016.
Active Learning with Misspecified Prior, (with G. Romanyuk and P. Strack), 2016.
Type-Compatible Equilibria in Signalling Games, (with K. He), 2016.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs, (with Y. Kamada), 2017.
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices, (with P. Strack and T. Strzalecki), 2017. Formerly under «Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sequential Sampling.»
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeships, (with L. Rayo), 2017.
Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races, „ (with R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz and J. Tirole// European Economic Review, 22 (1983), 3-31.
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games“ (with D.K. Levine)// Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (1983), pp. 251–268.
Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility» (with J. Tirole)//Journal of Economic Theory, 31, (1983), pp. 227–250.
Learning by Doing and Market Performance (with J. Tirole)//Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1983), pp. 522–530.
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (with J. Tirole)//Review of Economics Studies, 50 (1983), pp. 221–247.
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look (with J. Tirole)//American Economic Review, 74 (1984), pp. 361–366.
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology (with J. Tirole)//Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 383–402
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information» (with D.K. Levine and J. Tirole), pp. 73–98 /A. Roth, ed.//Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, - Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (with D.K. Levine)//Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1986), 261—279.
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (with E. Maskin)//
Econometrica
, 54 (1986), 533—554.
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly (with J. Tirole)//Econometrica, 54 (1986), 943—960.
A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation (with J. Tirole)// Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1986), - pp. 366–376.
Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (with D.K. Levine and J. Tirole)//Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1987), 37-50.
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization (with J. Tirole)//American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 77 (1987), - pp. 176–183.
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents (with D. Kreps)//Review of Economic Studies, 54 (1987), - pp. 541–568.